The theory of moral sentiments
定 價:39 元
叢書名:世界大師原典文庫
- 作者:(英) Adam Smith著
- 出版時間:2012/9/1
- ISBN:9787300164151
- 出 版 社:中國人民大學(xué)出版社
- 中圖法分類:H319.4:B
- 頁碼:xi, 565頁
- 紙張:膠版紙
- 版次:1
- 開本:32開
《世界·大師·原典·文庫:道德情操論(中文導(dǎo)讀插圖版)》是亞當(dāng)·斯密的倫理學(xué)著作,他一生中共修訂過六次。斯密從人類的情感和同情心出發(fā),討論了善惡、美丑、正義、責(zé)任等一系列概念,進而揭示出人類社會賴以維系、和諧發(fā)展的秘密。《道德情操論》對于促進人類福利這一更大的社會目的起到了更為基本的作用,是市場經(jīng)濟良性運行不可或缺的“圣經(jīng)”,堪稱西方世界的《論語》。
如果把《國富論》的巨大成功看作在當(dāng)時社會轉(zhuǎn)型過程中亞當(dāng),斯密在其道德理論的土壤上培養(yǎng)出的豐碩果實,那么無疑在人類社會同樣面臨重大轉(zhuǎn)型的當(dāng)代,在天平已經(jīng)越來越偏向自愛的時代,對于這一理論的探討同樣十分重要!兜赖虑椴僬摗窚(zhǔn)確傳達了斯密深邃的道德理論。溫家寶總理先后五次在不同場合推薦這部大師巨著。
亞當(dāng)·斯密,18世紀英國著名的經(jīng)濟學(xué)家和倫理學(xué)家。斯密一生奉獻了兩部傳世經(jīng)典:《道德情操論》和《國富論》。楊慧林教授,中國人民大學(xué)副校長,中國人民大學(xué)文學(xué)院教授,博士生導(dǎo)師。金莉教授,北京外國語大學(xué)副校長,全國政協(xié)委員,北京外國語大學(xué)英語學(xué)院教授,博士生導(dǎo)師。韓東暉教授,博士,中國人民大學(xué)哲學(xué)院副院長,博士生導(dǎo)師,專長是西方哲學(xué)研究。劉小楓博士,中國人民大學(xué)文學(xué)院教授,博士生導(dǎo)師,專長是西方文學(xué)、哲學(xué)和宗教研究等。
Part Ⅰ Of the Propriety of Action
Section I Of the Sense of Propriety
Section Ⅱ Of the Degrees of the Different Passions Which Are Consistent with Propriety
Section Ⅲ Of the Effects of Prosperity and Adversity upon the Judgment of Mankind with regard to the Propriety of Action; and why it is more easy to obtain their Approbation in the one state than in the other
Part Ⅱ Of Merit and Demerit; or, of the Objects of Reward
SectionⅠOf the Sense of Merit and Demerit
Section Ⅱ Of Justice and Beneficence
Section Ⅲ Of the Influence of Fortune upon the Sentiments of Mankind, with regard to the Merit or Demerit of Actions
Part Ⅲ Of the Foundation of Our Judgments Concerning Our Own Sentiments and Conduct,and of the Sense of Duty
Part Ⅳ Of the Effect of Utility upon the Sentiment of Approbation
Part Ⅴ Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion upon the Sentiments of Moral Approbation and Disapprobation
Part Ⅵ Of the Character of Virtue
Section Ⅰ Of the Character of the Individual,so far as it affects his own Happiness;or of Prudence
Section Ⅱ Of the Character of the Individual,so far as it can affect the Happiness of other People
Section Ⅲ of Self-command
Conclusion of the Six Part
Part Ⅶ Of Systems of Moral Philosophy
Section Ⅰ Of the Questions which ought to be examined in a Theory of Moral Sentiments
Section Ⅱ Of the different Accounts which have been given of the Nature of Virtue
Section Ⅲ Of the different Systems which have been formed concerning the Principle of Approbation
Section Ⅳ Of the Manner in which different Authors have treated of the practical Rules of Morality
Chap.Ⅳ The same subject continued
We may judge of the propriety or impropriety of the sentiments of another person by their correspondence or disagreement with our own, upon two different occasions; either, first, when the objects which excite them are considered without any peculiar relation,either to ourselves or to the person whose sentiments we judge of;or, secondly, when they are considered as peculiarly affecting one or other of us.
1. With regard to those objects which are considered without any peculiar relation either to ourselves or to the person whose sentiments we judge of; wherever his sentiments entirely correspond with our own, we ascribe to him the qualities of taste and good judgment. The beauty of a plain, the greatness of a mountain, the ornaments of a building, the expression of a picture, the composition of a discourse, the conduct of a third person, the proportions of different quantities and numbers, the various appearances which the great machine of the universe is perpetually exhibiting, with the secret wheels and springs which produce them; all the general subjects of science and taste, are what we and our companion regard as having no peculiar relation to either of us. We both look at them from the same point of view, and we have no occasion for sympathy, or for that imaginary change of situations from which it arises, in order to produce, with regard to these, the most perfect harmony of sentiments and affections. If, notwithstanding, we are often differently affected, it arises either from the different degrees of attention, which our different habits of life allow us to give easily to the several parts of those complex objects, or from the different degrees of natural acuteness in the faculty of the mind to which they are addressed.
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