本書基于信息不對(duì)稱理論及代理理論等,系統(tǒng)闡述管理層從事盈余管理活動(dòng)的動(dòng)機(jī),并引出影響上市公司盈余管理行為的內(nèi)部治理及外部制度環(huán)境因素,進(jìn)而采用規(guī)范研究和實(shí)證研究相結(jié)合的方法,以我國(guó)及國(guó)際上市公司為研究對(duì)象,對(duì)內(nèi)部人特征、會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則實(shí)施、法律保護(hù)環(huán)境等因素是否影響以及如何影響上市公司盈余管理行為進(jìn)行全面深入研究。
前言
盈余管理是指在遵循會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則相關(guān)規(guī)定的基礎(chǔ)上,企業(yè)管理層通過對(duì)企業(yè)對(duì)外報(bào)告的會(huì)計(jì)收益信息進(jìn)行主觀控制或調(diào)整,以實(shí)現(xiàn)自身利益最大化的行為。盈余管理行為的出現(xiàn)既會(huì)在公司經(jīng)濟(jì)業(yè)績(jī)方面誤導(dǎo)投資者,也會(huì)影響以會(huì)計(jì)信息為依據(jù)的契約結(jié)果。上市公司盈余管理行為近年來受到了企業(yè)利益相關(guān)方的廣泛關(guān)注。在對(duì)相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行全面梳理和回顧的基礎(chǔ)上,本書基于代理矛盾、政治成本和公司特有信息保護(hù)的視角,系統(tǒng)闡述管理層從事盈余管理活動(dòng)的動(dòng)機(jī),并引出影響上市公司盈余管理行為的內(nèi)部治理及外部制度環(huán)境因素,進(jìn)而采用規(guī)范研究和實(shí)證研究相結(jié)合的方法,以我國(guó)及國(guó)際上市公司為研究對(duì)象,對(duì)公司治理機(jī)制、會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則實(shí)施、股權(quán)分置改革、法律保護(hù)環(huán)境等因素是否影響以及如何影響上市公司盈余管理行為進(jìn)行全面、深入的研究。
具體來說,已有國(guó)內(nèi)外關(guān)于盈余管理決定因素的研究,主要集中于公司及國(guó)家層面治理機(jī)制因素與公司盈余管理的關(guān)系。但這一類型的研究大都不可避免地受到內(nèi)生性問題的困擾。為此,本研究從如下幾個(gè)方面展開相關(guān)論述和分析,力求緩解內(nèi)生性問題的影響,并對(duì)已有研究提供有益的補(bǔ)充。
首先,近年來學(xué)術(shù)界對(duì)公司盈余管理的研究日益深入,盈余管理逐漸從一個(gè)研究問題演化成一個(gè)研究領(lǐng)域。在此背景下,本書收集并梳理國(guó)內(nèi)外盈余管理的相關(guān)文獻(xiàn),重點(diǎn)關(guān)注盈余管理影響因素方面的單一國(guó)家研究和跨國(guó)研究。本書選取會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則變更、公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)和法律保護(hù)作為研究切入點(diǎn),系統(tǒng)總結(jié)了相關(guān)因素與企業(yè)盈余管理行為的關(guān)系,以揭示該領(lǐng)域的研究現(xiàn)狀和未來趨勢(shì)。
其次,已有的研究普遍認(rèn)為,公司治理是中國(guó)上市公司盈余管理的一個(gè)重要決定因素,但很少有研究考慮制度變革(如新會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則的實(shí)施)在其中所發(fā)揮的潛在作用。在此基礎(chǔ)上,本書借助我國(guó)新會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則的實(shí)施以及股權(quán)分置改革的完成這一系列重大制度的變化,系統(tǒng)分析了公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)以及制度因素如何對(duì)企業(yè)盈余管理行為產(chǎn)生影響。相關(guān)研究結(jié)論表明,在制度環(huán)境尚不完善的情況下,監(jiān)管者不能忽視會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則變革在企業(yè)會(huì)計(jì)信息披露方面具有的消極影響;同時(shí),在研究盈余管理的影響因素時(shí)也應(yīng)盡可能地控制外生性制度因素(如新會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則的實(shí)施等)對(duì)盈余管理的潛在影響。
再次,已有的跨國(guó)研究認(rèn)為,法律保護(hù)程度是公司盈余管理的另一重要決定因素,但這類研究往往忽視了非法律因素的存在及其與法律因素的自相關(guān)性。因此,這類研究得到的結(jié)論往往是不可靠的。為有效解決這一問題,本書在探析法律保護(hù)與盈余管理的關(guān)系時(shí),采用單一國(guó)家分析的方法,以克服非法律因素對(duì)結(jié)果的干擾。為此,本書借助中國(guó)上市公司數(shù)據(jù),檢驗(yàn)了地區(qū)法律保護(hù)對(duì)企業(yè)盈余管理行為的影響。本書發(fā)現(xiàn),在股權(quán)分置改革前,地區(qū)法律保護(hù)程度的提升能夠顯著緩解區(qū)域內(nèi)企業(yè)的盈余管理行為,說明了完善的法制環(huán)境能夠加大和提高企業(yè)管理者面臨訴訟的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和名譽(yù)損失成本,從而抑制其盈余管理行為。進(jìn)一步的研究表明,地區(qū)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)保護(hù)力度與盈余管理行為顯著負(fù)相關(guān),這一結(jié)果證實(shí)了對(duì)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)的保護(hù)能夠減輕企業(yè)對(duì)于技術(shù)外泄的擔(dān)憂,進(jìn)而減少企業(yè)為避免技術(shù)外泄而進(jìn)行的盈余管理行為。另外,在股權(quán)分置改革期間以及新會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則實(shí)施后,區(qū)域法律保護(hù)對(duì)企業(yè)盈余管理的影響并不顯著。
最后,已有關(guān)于法律保護(hù)與盈余管理關(guān)系的研究,大多采用舊的投資者保護(hù)指數(shù)對(duì)一個(gè)國(guó)家或地區(qū)法律保護(hù)程度進(jìn)行衡量。近年來,權(quán)威學(xué)者對(duì)舊的指數(shù)做了詳盡的優(yōu)化,并且已經(jīng)構(gòu)建出了一系列新的投資者保護(hù)指數(shù)。因此,先前使用舊的指數(shù)所得出的關(guān)于法律保護(hù)與盈余管理關(guān)系的結(jié)果有可能因?yàn)榕f的指數(shù)所存在的固有缺陷而降低可信度;诖耍狙芯窟x取新的投資者保護(hù)指數(shù),收集40多個(gè)國(guó)家或地區(qū)的上市公司作為研究樣本,對(duì)法律保護(hù)程度與公司盈余管理的關(guān)系做了重新的衡量。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),在采用新的投資者保護(hù)指數(shù)的情況下,法律保護(hù)程度的提升并不能顯著減少企業(yè)的盈余管理行為;較為集中的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)更容易引發(fā)盈余管理行為,這一效應(yīng)在投資者保護(hù)程度較弱的國(guó)家或地區(qū)更為顯著;高效的公司治理機(jī)制可以有效減少企業(yè)的盈余管理行為,這一效應(yīng)在投資者保護(hù)程度較強(qiáng)的國(guó)家或地區(qū)更加明顯。這一結(jié)果表明,較弱的法律保護(hù)容易引發(fā)控股股東出于掩蓋利益侵占動(dòng)機(jī)的盈余管理行為,而較強(qiáng)的法律保護(hù)能夠提供完善的制度環(huán)境,從而促進(jìn)公司治理機(jī)制發(fā)揮積極的作用。
本書的結(jié)論具有如下啟示意義:①當(dāng)國(guó)內(nèi)制度環(huán)境與新政策實(shí)施要求不一致時(shí),政策制定者不能忽視新政策實(shí)施所帶來的潛在負(fù)面效應(yīng);②考慮到制度變革(如股權(quán)分置改革和新會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則的實(shí)施)對(duì)公司盈余管理的作用,未來相關(guān)研究在探析我國(guó)上市公司盈余管理的決定因素時(shí),應(yīng)控制上述外生事件的影響;③考慮到當(dāng)前相關(guān)研究動(dòng)向以及對(duì)舊的投資者保護(hù)指數(shù)賦值方面問題的批判,未來關(guān)于法律保護(hù)經(jīng)濟(jì)后果的研究應(yīng)使用更新后的投資者保護(hù)指數(shù),從而避免結(jié)果偏差。
張宇揚(yáng)
2020年5月
張宇揚(yáng),北京郵電大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)管理學(xué)院財(cái)會(huì)中心講師,經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)博士,主要從事公司治理、公司理財(cái)、會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量方面的科研工作,在國(guó)內(nèi)外學(xué)術(shù)刊物發(fā)表論文10余篇,主持或參與國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金項(xiàng)目,北京市社會(huì)科學(xué)基金項(xiàng)目、中央高校基本科研業(yè)務(wù)費(fèi)項(xiàng)目等。
Contents
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivations of corporate earnings management
1.2 The determinants of corporate earnings management
1.3 Objectives of the study
1.4 Structure of the study
2 Literature review of corporate earnings management
2.1 Accounting standards and earnings management
2.2 Corporate governance and earnings management
2.3 Legal protection and earnings management
2.4 Summary and suggestions
3 How do regulatory scrutiny, accounting standards and insiders′ incentives affect earnings management? Evidence from China
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Background issues and hypotheses
3.3 Variables
3.4 Sample selection and data
3.5 Regression results
3.6 Conclusions
4 Regional legal protection and earnings management: Evidence from China
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Literature review, legal environment index and hypothesis
4.3 Variables
4.4 Sample selection and data
4.5 Regression results
4.6 Conclusions
5 Corporate governance, investor protection and earnings management: New international evidence
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Measures of earnings management
5.3 Proxies for investor protection and corporate governance
5.4 Sample selection and data
5.5 Empirical results
5.6 Conclusions
6 Conclusions and implications
Reference
Corporate earnings management activities have recently drew considerable attention from various entities including regulators, practitioners and mass media.Researchers have intensively investigated determinants of earnings management. After reviewing large body of literature in Chapter 2, this study points out that most of previous studies implement cross-sectional analyses regarding the relation between firm characteristics and earnings management, which are inevitably subject to endogeneity problems. Previous studies stress that corporate governance structures are a significant determinant of earnings management. To the best of my knowledge,however, there are not many papers regarding whether corporate governance structures affect earnings management as much as institutional factors like accounting standards.Recent studies also suggest that legal protection improves earnings quality. However,we argue that those studies have two important drawbacks:(a)analyses that use country/region-level legal protection indices, which are correlated to non-legal country/region characteristics(e. g., culture or religion), potentially find a seeming relation between legal protection and earnings management;(b)previous studies commonly use an aged legal protection index which has been recently subject to criticism on the coding problem.
This study attempts to present empirical analyses of the issue that address the aforementioned concerns. Chapter 3 compares impacts of insiders′incentives on earnings management to those of accounting standards by using Chinese data. Chinesefirms experienced two important institutional changes during the past decade:the Split-share Structure Reform;the mandatory implementation of IFRS-convergent New Accounting Standards. These events that are likely to substantially change insiders′incentives and accounting standards provide a good material to investigate:(a)whether corporate governance structures affect earnings management as much as accounting standards;(b)whether the change in corporate governance structures surrounding the important institutional change(the Split-share Structure Reform)is related to the change in earnings management. The latter analysis is advantageous in mitigating endogeneity problems that annoy previous studies. We find that the introduction of New Accounting Standards significantly increased earnings management. Although we do not find evidence that the Split-share Structure Reform directly decreased earnings management of the average firm, the increase in earnings management surrounding the